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Abstract
Trustworthy system development entails a high non-
recurring engineering (NRE) cost together with a low volume
of units over which to amortize that cost. For example, the
potential for developmental and operational attacks against
hardware requires countermeasures that make it very expen-
sive to design and manufacture custom hardware used to
build high assurance systems. To address these problems, we
propose an approach to trustworthy system development based
on 3-D integration, an emerging chip fabrication technique
in which two or more integrated circuit dies are fabricated
individually and then combined into a single stack using
vertical conductive posts. With 3-D integration, a general-
purpose die, or computation plane, can be combined with a
special-purpose die, or control plane. We discuss the security
advantages of using 3-D integrated hardware in sensitive
applications, where security is of the utmost importance, and
we outline problems, challenges, attacks, solutions, and topics
for future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware-oriented security is growing in importance as
attackers increasingly target the lowest level of system abstrac-
tion. 3-D integration is an emerging technology for designing
efficient chips by stacking two or more integrated circuit (IC)
dies and connecting them with conductive posts. Unlike tradi-
tional coprocessors, a 3-D integration design approach offers
the ability to monitor and even override internal structures of a
processor. For example, on-chip bus traffic can be monitored,
and bus connections can be disabled. With these capabilities,
3-D integration can be used to provide secure alternate services
(e.g., cryptographic processing at much higher bandwidth than
a coprocessor), isolation, and passive monitoring for mass-
produced processors.
In our basic paradigm, a 3-D chip consists of one die
that is a commodity microprocessor and another die that
contains application-specific security functionality; we refer to
the commodity die as the computation plane and the custom
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Fig. 1. Isolated cores, surrounded by 2-D moats, and network-on-chip routers.
Here, using two IC planes, the routers help to enforce a Multilevel Security
(MLS) policy on information flow in the lower plane. In this example, each
core has been assigned a label of either TOP SECRET (TS), SECRET (S),
CONFIDENTIAL (C), or UNCLASSIFIED (U).
die as the control plane (or resource1 plane in situations
where resources are simply made available). Figure 1 shows
an example system in which multiple CPU cores reside in
the computation plane, and routers reside in the control plane.
The control plane and computation plane can be fabricated
at separate foundries and conjoined in a third facility. When
the control plane contains mechanisms that enforce a policy on
the computation plane, to achieve a requisite level of trust, the
fabrication of the control plane and the conjoining operation
can take place in a trusted foundry.
Developing high assurance systems is costly. Our approach
has the potential to reduce the cost of developing hardware
for high assurance systems by joining a mass-produced com-
putation plane with a custom control plane. Our approach
provides several advantages, including (1) dual use of the
computation plane, which can be optionally combined with a
control plane housing application-specific security functions;
(2) physical isolation and logical disentanglement of security
functions in the control plane from the non-security circuitry
in the computation plane; (3) controlled lineage (e.g., use
of a trusted foundry to manufacture the control plane); (4)
1Resources are the totality of all active and passive entities on a chip, across
a wide range of abstractions. For example, a storage buffer, an accumulator,
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Fig. 2. Circuit-level primitives for trustworthy 3-D design [28]. The disabling circuit can stop a signal in the computation plane from flowing, based on the
control plane’s command, which is sent through a dedicated post. The tapping circuit copies a signal from the computation plane to the control plane. Two
posts are needed: one to carry the signal to the control plane and another for the command to connect the signal. The rerouting circuit combines tapping and
disabling so that the original signal only goes to the control plane. The inserting circuit carries a signal from the control plane to a circuit on the computation
plane. The overriding circuit combines inserting and disabling, first disabling the original signal in the computation plane and then introducing a new signal
from the control plane.
high bandwidth communication and low latency between the
computation plane and components in the control plane such
as coprocessors, memory, or other devices; and (5) direct,
granular access by the control plane to internal structures in
the computation plane.
The threat model we address is that of malicious hardware
and software in the computation plane, although for this work
we assume that the primitives we introduce on the computation
plane remain intact, e.g., in the face of various malicious
inclusions and probing of the computation plane.
In this paper, we present concepts and ideas for 3-D design
based on a system security architecture that supports a variety
of policies including those that specify legal communication
between policy equivalence classes2. We explore minor mod-
ifications to the 3-D design flow to support these methods.
We also describe new circuit-level primitives to support this
technique and introduce the use of distinct layers available in
a 3-D IC as a primitive for the physical isolation of hardware
components. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are:
• The application to 3-D IC design of a proven design
practice based on a system security architecture.
• A general-purpose circuit-level primitive to support this
design approach by allowing different control planes to
be conjoined with the same computation plane (or vice-
versa).
• A diode circuit-level primitive to support this approach
by enforcing the one-way flow of information in a 3-D
IC.
• A design approach that uses distinct IC layers, with
2The system resources are partitioned into separate classes, where each
member of a class is treated equivalently with respect to the security policy.
Technically, an equivalence class is formed by a set and binary relation. Here,
the set is all system resources, and the relation is “has the same policy as.”
separate lineage and developmental assurance, to achieve
physical separation of hardware components, providing
secure application capabilities even in the presence of an
untrusted processor and OS software.
• Requirements for automated 3-D IC design tools for the
physical layout of components. Since fully automated
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) for 3-D circuit
design and layout are still evolving, this paper provides
high-level requirements analysis aimed at influencing
their development so that security is adopted as a princi-
pal constraint in the practice of 3-D IC design.
• Offloading of testing circuitry to removable test planes to
reduce the cost of design for test.
II. STANDARDIZATION OF INTERFACES
The ability to conjoin different control planes with the same
computation plane allows a variety of application-specific
security enhancements (e.g., policy enforcement mechanisms)
while reusing a mass-produced computation plane. To ac-
complish this, however, requires a standard interface to the
computation plane. A standardized interface also enables a
mass-produced control plane (e.g., a 3-D crypto coprocessor)
to be conjoined to a variety of computation planes. Achieving
standardization requires overcoming several challenges:
• Standard placement of posts
• Diverse manufacturing processes (e.g., face-to-face vs.
face-to-back bonding)
• Diverse electrical and timing properties of dies
• Diverse sizes and form factors of dies
• Diverse packaging options for 3D-ICs
• Standardization places constraints on 3-D floor planning
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Fig. 3. Primitive TSV functions and corresponding selectively refined functions. The diode is placed between the native (computation plane) circuit and the
TSV receptacle, such that the diode controls the flow regardless of how the TSV receptacle is used by the control plane.
The basic idea is the identification of a standard set of logical
TSV receptacles on the computation plane, each related to
a basic function (e.g., tapping the internal bus, tapping the
instruction pipeline, etc.). As long as the basic set of TSV
receptacles is present, then variance in their physical layout
from processor type to processor type can be accommodated
in simple realignment (e.g., with a hardware adaption layer)
of the control plane. Furthermore, reusing the precise physical
layout of either a control plane or a computation plane is both
more challenging and less interesting than reusing the higher-
level design of a custom plane.
A. Standard Primitives
In this section we introduce two novel circuit-level prim-
itives, a diode and a general-purpose TSV receptacle, that
support our design approach. Previous work introduced five
primitive functions for controlling information flow between
planes: disabling, tapping, rerouting, inserting, and overriding,
as shown in Figure 2. First, we introduce the diode and two
assured functions that result from its application.
1) Diode: A diode, as shown in Figure 3, allows informa-
tion to flow in only one direction from one component to an-
other3. Such an arrangement can enforce a policy requiring that
information can flow from a low confidentiality component to
a high confidentiality component4 but not vice-versa. In other
words, in a system whose resources have been partitioned
into policy equivalence classes, a diode can be applied to a
primitive to enforce the one-way flow of information between
these classes. Diodes provide a granularity of enforcement
related to the granularity of components that they connect.
Diodes can be static or programmable, and they can ensure
that vertical posts do not violate the inter-plane policy, e.g.,
by placing diodes between a post and the circuitry of a plane.
3Note that one-way communication can be enforced using other electrical
techniques besides a diode
4Given a lattice of confidentiality markings, “high” markings are those that
are closer to the top (the universal upper bound), and “low” markings are
those that are closer to the bottom (the universal lower bound).
We expect, however, that this hard-wired enforcement can
have unforeseen effects, e.g., on the performance of bidi-
rectional communication protocols, and that programmable
diodes would provide flexibility in the designs supported.
The primitives each provide an environment for receiving
one or two posts. We refer to this computation plane environ-
ment as a TSV receptacle/socket.
2) Generic TSV Receptacle: A general-purpose TSV recep-
tacle can be used to support multiple control plane applications
with the same computation plane, e.g., when different control
planes are used or when the applications on a given control
plane are reconfigured. These generic TSV receptacles are
used to anchor posts on the computation plane to minimize
the number of TSV receptacle types that the processor manu-
facturer must produce and allows a given TSV receptacle to be
used for different purposes from application to appplication.
Supporting these features requires identifying standard loca-
tions for posts on the computation plane such that generality is
balanced against the hardware resources (e.g., posts) required
(see future work).
Figure 4 shows a general-purpose TSV receptacle that
supports any of the five basic circuit-level primitives. To make
use of a TSV receptacle, signals on the control plane determine
which primitive is active at a given point in time. Thus,
different 3-D applications can use the same TSV receptacle
in a different way. Only one configuration of the Generic
TSV Receptacle is required even though, for example, one
application might read from a TSV receptacle, and another
might override circuits with it.
A generic TSV receptacle provides design flexibility at
the cost of additional circuitry and posts. The Generic TSV
Receptacle accepts four posts (three control and one data)
implementing four primitive features internally: one tapping
or insertion feature and two disabling features. These are
combined to implement disabling (i), tapping (ii and iii),
rerouting (ii, iii, and iv), inserting (ii and iii), overriding (i, ii,




Fig. 4. Generic TSV Receptacle. A general-purpose TSV receptacle
supports any of the basic circuit-level primitives (disabling, tapping, rerouting,
inserting, and overriding). Signals from the control plane determine which
primitive is active at a given point in time. Thus, the application on each
different control plane could use a given TSV receptacle in a different way:
one application might tap a TSV receptacle, and another might override it.
The control posts are i and ii, and the data posts are iii and iv.
The Generic TSV Receptacle could include diodes to assure
that the information flows of each post are precisely controlled,
in which case the diode for post iii could be programmable to
support reading or writing.
3) Application Classes: This section describes several cat-
egories of 3-D applications that can be built using our frame-
work [28], [8]:
• Secure Alternate Service. This category provides a trust-
worthy enhancement to the service provided by the com-
putation plane. Examples include ciphers, key storage,
compression, and network-on-chip (NoC) routers.
• Isolation and Protection. This category actively overrides
the computation plane to enforce access control, eliminate
points of interference, or disable communication. Exam-
ples include the 3-D cache eviction monitor described
in [28] and enforcing a policy on buses or NoC routers
in the computation plane, as shown in Figure 6.
• Passive Monitoring. This category passively monitors the
computation plane. Examples include audit, information
flow tracking, and runtime checks.
III. ISOLATION OF HARDWARE EQUIVALENCE CLASSES
Arranging system components to structurally support a
security policy results in a security architecture [14]. Re-
alization of a multi-level security (MLS) policy in a 3-D
system requires establishing (1) policy equivalence classes;
(2) isolation of components according to those classes; and (3)
controlled interaction between classes according to an inter-
class communication policy.
4) Policy Equivalence Classes: Grouping similar entities
into a domain or equivalence class helps simplify the design
of secure systems.
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Fig. 5. A hypothetical layout of CPUs on several computation planes, where
each CPU is a point in the lattice. This system consists of three layers: the
lower layer contains a CPU with an UNCLASSIFIED (U) label and a CPU
with a CONFIDENTIAL (C) label; the middle layer contains two CPUs with a
SECRET (S) label; and the upper layer contains a CPU with a TOP SECRET
(TS) label.
Consider a system security policy for a 3-D IC in which the
computation plane contains several cores: a given application
workload may require that two cores devoted to a sensitive
application be isolated from the rest. To achieve isolation,
computational components belonging to the same equivalence
class can be placed on the same layer (die). On the other
hand, multiple equivalence classes may reside on a layer (see
the lower plane in Figure 5) if they are spatially or otherwise
separated. Thus, the dies and cores can be partially ordered
with strong separation, as shown in Figure 5. To achieve
controlled sharing, only specified inter-die posts are permitted,
and the 3-D design is statically checked to ensure that posts do
not violate the policy. In other words, the physical separation
between layers and between cores on a layer result in a
conceptual moat, and connections that cross moat boundaries
(viz., drawbridges), must conform to the policy, as was shown
to be effective in [7]. For generality, the diodes and junctions
in Figure 5 would be programmable, to support a wide range
of policies.
3-D integration offers the unique capability to physically
isolate hardware components by arranging circuitry into dis-
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Fig. 6. Example of rerouting bus signals in the computation plane through the control plane [28].
in which physical isolation possible with separate layers is
similar to a 2-D moat.
We can use a combination of moats and 3D planes to isolate
the equivalence classes. Moats separate CPUs on a given
plane, and each plane is physically isolated from other planes.
Drawbridges connect different moats on the same plane.
The isolation need not be complete. The standard MLS
policy for information flow allows a “downward” flow in the
lattice. Diodes and other electrical mechanisms can enforce
such a one-way flow and we can use automated analysis
techniques such as information flow tracking [27], [25] to
verify that the flows conform to the policy.
To facilitate the controlled interaction of isolated layers, it
is necessary to ensure that only specified vertical connections
exist between these layers, where the specification includes
directionality of information allowed between layers consistent
with the MLS sensitivity of the layers. We also extend the
idea of a 2-D drawbridge into 3-D, in which the architectural
integrity of vertical connections between layers must be stat-
ically checked, similar to a 2-D drawbridge.
Furthermore, it is possible to use 2-D moats and draw-
bridges within an individual layer, when design requirements
(e.g., cost limitations) dictate that more than one equivalence
class must reside on a layer. In order to separate the cores
residing on a given chip, various structures must be partitioned
and/or virtualized, including on-chip memory and compu-
tational components. Other points of interference between
cores that must be constrained include interconnect (e.g., on-
chip bus or on-chip network), I/O devices, and dependencies
(e.g., power, I/O, privilege, etc.). Other structures (e.g., micro-
connections not visible at a high level of system abstraction)
may also need to be partitioned.
5) Core Isolation: Isolation is a foundational concept in
computer security [24]. At the hardware level, it is possible
to isolate circuitry spatially. Hardware functionality can be
physically isolated by using air gaps or other techniques
described as moats and drawbridges [7], [9]. To facilitate the
controlled interaction between isolated equivalence classes, it
is necessary to ensure that only specified connections exist
between these domains. In the case where system components
communicate over a shared bus (or on-chip network), the
interconnect must be designed to prevent illegal information
flow between equivalence classes, e.g., using diodes or similar
arrangement to control the direction of flow.
6) Inter-Class Communication Policy: At the highest level
of abstraction, an inter-class communication policy for a 3-D
system must first specify what the equivalence classes are and
what information flows are permissible between the classes.
Then, the system resources should be partitioned with respect
to the equivalence classes. Figure 5 shows an example of a
lattice policy. Barring the use of a time sharing approach,
the policy should also specify which equivalence class each
core is assigned. A given equivalence class may span multiple
dies and even off-chip I/O and memory traffic. This high-level
policy must be mapped to enforcement mechanisms at a lower
level of abstraction, either by a talented human designer or
by automated tools that assist the designer in visualizing the
3-D security architecture and exploring the design space of
3-D mechanisms. Finally, the flows allowed between classes
are chosen, providing a partial order relation required of the
lattice. For example, in an MLS policy, we order the classes
(TS ≥ S ≥ C ≥ U) and allow a flow from class A to class B





Fig. 7. Top view of a hypothetical multi-core integrated circuit. Four
regions of the chip correspond to the hierarchical General Service (GENSER)
equivalence classes of TOP SECRET (TS), SECRET (S), CONFIDENTIAL
(C), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).
Figures 7 and 8 show examples of more complex 3-D secu-
rity architectures. The system shown in Figure 8 obeys an MLS
policy, as described above. Diodes enforce the one-way flow
of information. Junctions, which are two-way connections,
connect memory and cores with equal labels. Programmable
junctions can be set to act as a diode for which the layer
reads the TSV, a diode for which the TSV reads the layer, or
a two-way connection.
To avoid the security issues of sharing a CPU between
equivalence classes (e.g., side channels and other covert
channels) we dedicate each CPU to an equivalence class
in our lattice-based policy, and then ensure that unwanted
interference between CPUs is impossible.
Included in the equivalence class of a given CPU are its ded-
icated memory (L1) and any dedicated board-resident devices.
L2 memory may be shared with another CPU only if cache
side channel interference has been eliminated, effectively
virtualizing the L2 cache [29], as shown in Figures 9 and 10.
7) 3-D Design Flow: As the standards for 3-D Electronic
Design Automation (EDA) tools are still emerging, a com-
plete standard design flow is not yet available, as described
in [1], [21], and [15]. Existing design flows are limited to
a specific 3-D fabrication technology and a fixed number
of planes, and there is no standard fabrication technology.
Therefore, talented human designers must balance multiple
constraints simultaneously to achieve the desired design prop-
erties. In a 3-D design flow, the positioning of components
on different layers may perturb the properties achieved on the
individual layers, e.g., vertical proximity may increase thermal
factors.
3-D design is very challenging because the large number of
interacting constraints result in a complex optimization prob-
lem. Specifically, the designer must balance several factors in
achieving overall properties such as performance, bandwidth,
yield, cost, and testability:
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Fig. 8. Side view of a hypothetical 3-D integrated circuit with seven layers.
• power distribution (current delivery) [11] and power
limits
• clock delivery, timing analysis, and dissimilar clock rates
• packaging, handling, wafer alignment, and bonding
• mechanical stress [2] and metal resistivity/expansion
• via density, via size, via count, and via location
• the number of vertical connections required and the
length of the posts
• variation across planes: dissimilar via resistance and pitch
• I/O, die-to-die signaling, bus fan-in, and bus fan-out
Despite these daunting challenges, numerous 3-D systems
have been built (see Section VII: Related Work), including a








Fig. 9. System-level view of a two-tier 3-D IC. The computation plane contains a dual-core chip multi-processor and shared L2 cache, all connected to a




Fig. 10. System-level view of the computation plane of the two-tier 3-D IC
shown in Figure 9.
8) Design Flow Modifications: Our technique involves
making minor modifications to the 3-D IC design flow,
specifically the stage referred to as floor planning, which
is performed after logic synthesis and the validation of the
functional correctness of the circuitry. In other words, the de-
sign is initially agnostic about floor planning, yet partitioning
of certain resources among layers (to respect a policy-based
partial ordering of resources) may be a first-order constraint.
To most effectively use 3-D technology, the designer must
consider the ordering and connections of the 3-D security ar-
chitecture as constraints when performing floor planning. Prior
to floor planning, the designer must already have a coarse-
grained understanding of (1) what computational resources
will reside on which layers; (2) the vertical connections
permitted between layers; (3) the transitive closure of flows
induced by posts; (4) the horizontal connections permitted
between components within a layer; and (5) constraints on 2-
D and 3-D interconnect (e.g., bus or router), such as enforcing
a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme.
Arriving at this coarse-grained picture requires the designer
to refine the security architecture. Automated tools can assist
the designer in exploring the design space of 3-D security
architectures and to validate that the security architecture
correctly supports the policy.
A multistep floor planning approach is described in [21],
which involves first assigning blocks to planes (i.e., parti-
tioning) and then allowing blocks to be rearranged within a
plane (i.e., intra-plane moves). Allowing simultaneous inter-
and intra-plane moves results in an unmanageable optimization
problem size. Working within this multistep paradigm, security
constrains the first step when, for example, blocks are assigned
to planes according to the functional relationship between
planes and blocks. Security also constrains the second step
when blocks are rearranged within a plane to achieve the
specified security properties. For example, intra-plane rear-
rangement of blocks results in the positioning of a TS memory
region in one plane directly above a TS core in another plane
and may require the arrangement of air gaps between blocks
within a plane. To decrease the complexity of the optimization
problem, the design tools could be instructed to only allow the
partial ordering of components rather than the more stringent
requirement of assigning components to specific planes.
Floor planning establishes the precise geometric boundaries
of (1) the computational cores on the layers; (2) the vertical
connections between layers; and (3) the horizontal connections
within a layer. At this stage, it is necessary to statically check
that horizontal connections that cross 2-D moat boundaries
and vertical connections that cross layers (both extended
with transitive relations) do not violate the system security
policy (e.g., checking for extraneous connections between
equivalence classes). If these geometric boundaries of elements
determined during the layout process are specified in the GDS
II database file format, a static analysis program can check the
design for policy conformance by analyzing the GDS II file.
A. Other Uses besides MLS
1) Interconnect Built to Support MLS Policy: As discussed
earlier, an MLS security policy is based on a lattice of
sensitivity labels, e.g., TOP SECRET (TS), SECRET (S),
CONFIDENTIAL (C), UNCLASSIFIED (U). Each resource
controlled by the policy is assigned a label, such that the labels
partition the resources. All of the resources with the same label
are said to be in the same equivalence class.
Lattice-based policies can be generalized beyond those
with national security labels, as long as there is a means of
determining in which equivalence class a resource resides, and
the equivalence classes form a lattice.
2) Self-Protection and Dependency Layering: A secure
application must be protected from attack and must not depend
on any components that are less trustworthy. In a 3-D system,
self-protection requires that the computation plane cannot
short-circuit or surge the power of the control plane, make
requests to the control plane that cause buffers to overflow,
or modify the control plane. Dependency layering requires
that the control plane not request service from or wait on the
computation plane.
This paper does not address package-level concerns related
to I/O and power other than the isolation provided by separate
layers within the enclosure of the package. A more thorough
discussion of the axioms of self-protection and dependency
layering is applied to 3-D IC design in [8].
B. Topology Considerations
The form factor of the dies is a security architecture design
consideration. For example, a small memory tile could be
stacked on top of one moated region belonging to an equiva-
lence class. Provided that its form factor allows it to remain
within the bounds of the moated region on which it is placed,
it should be separate from another memory die stacked on top
(but within the bounds of) another moated region belonging to
a different equivalence class. A wide variety of 3-D structures
are possible in this manner.
IV. POWER AND I/O INDEPENDENCE
A variety of methods for achieving I/O independence for
the control plane are possible [8]. First, the control plane can
be located closest to the I/O and power pins, such that it
provides these services to the computation plane. Otherwise,
wireless methods include capacitive/inductive coupling, short-
range RF, short-range optical, and simply attaching EEPROM.
Wired options include JTAG interface, serial cable, dedicated
pins, TDMA over HyperTransport, and dedicated memory
ranges. Providing an independent source of power to the
control plane can be achieved using the same circuit-level
primitives described above for computation signals. Wireless
power transmission technology is another option.
V. OFFLOADING OF TESTING CIRCUITRY
Design for test circuitry consumes significant die area and
therefore plays a major role in the cost of mass-produced
processors[5], [26]. DFT must not impact performance; must
have a small area cost; allow multiple uses when possible; and
be integrated into the design from the beginning [5].
While 3D-ICs have their own set of daunting test chal-
lenges [13], [30], [19], we argue that significant parts of the
DFT circuitry can be offloaded from the computation plane to
the control plane to reduce area impact. Furthermore, a 3-D
approach can mitigate some security concerns associated with
DFT circuitry. For example, Yang et al. showed that crypto
processors are vulnerable to attacks that use scan-based design
for test to steal crypto secrets [31]. With a 3-D approach, the
test interface does not have to ship with production systems;
instead, only a select number of computation planes are joined
with testing planes to support factory testing.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK
We are in the process of preparing a test bench for experi-
mentally validating and demonstrating the effectiveness of our
circuit-level primitives to determine how well they work when
fabricated. The 3-D chip will include a test harness which
will manage the invocation of and vary the inputs to each
circuit-level primitive and will read the outputs to verify that
the expected behavior occurs. The experiment will build the
primitives in different configurations. The frequency at which
a circuit can operate without modification will be compared
against: (1) the frequency at which it can operate with the
circuit-level modifications; and (2) the frequency at which it
an operate with both the circuit-level modifications and the
addition of a control plane.
VII. RELATED WORK
While 3-D integration is an emerging technology, a vari-
ety of 3-D applications have been realized, including imag-
ing [32], medicine [10], particle physics [6], reconfigurable
hardware [23], as well as high-performance microprocessors,
as described in [4], [22], [17], [16], and [12],
A 3-D cache monitor designed to mitigate access-driven
cache side channel attacks in a simultaneous multithreading
processor’s shared memory [29] has negligible computation
plane overhead in terms of area, delay, and performance [28].
The control plane maintains a data structure that records
whether cache lines are protected and for what process. Cache
evictions of a protected line are denied based on the security
policy. Experiments used an FPGA synthesis tool to collect
area and timing information, comparing the case involving
just the computation plane, the case involving just the control
plane, and the case involving the combined computation and
control plane. Evaluation of the impact of the delay of the
posts was based on data from Loi et al. [18], which found
that the worst-case delay between opposite corners of a chip
to be approximately .29ns, which is too small to affect the
performance of the critical path of the 3-D cache eviction
monitor. Analysis by Mysore et al. showed that the additional
area required for vias is small for 3-D applications that perform
introspection and profiling of the computation plane [20].
This paper builds on earlier work presented in [28] and [8]
that applied 3-D integration to the problem of hardware-
oriented security and trust as well as on the moats and
drawbridges technique developed for Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) presented in [7] and [9]. In addition
to the 3-D circuit-level primitives presented in [28] and [8], in
this paper we discuss an additional circuit-level primitive, the
diode, and we build upon this diode primitive to support policy
enforcement in a 3-D IC. We also introduce a general-purpose
TSV receptacle that can implement any of the primitives
described in earlier work, supported as necessary by the diode
primitive introduced in this paper.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
The use of disabling posts to selectively disable (by re-
moving power) wires in the computation plane that violate
the isolation of components could break some designs, in
which case the circuitry could remain unchanged but its use
audited by other posts. Determining which connections to
disable could utilize analytical tools from graph theory, e.g.,
determination of cut points. 3-D posts connected to these cut
points could be used to selectively disable the connections
without affecting other portions of the circuit. Ideally, the
native computation plane designer eliminates all points of
interference between the cores of a multi-core processor.
However, some connections are needed by some applications
but not others. It is possible that these connections could be
selectively disabled according to the policy. We also leave the
following to future work:
• The use of a reference monitor for providing fine-grained
policy enforcement in 3-D chips.
• The use of disabling posts in the context of dynamic
runtime policy changes, e.g., to allow moats that are
configurable at runtime, i.e., movable moats.
• The use of configurable diodes in the context of recon-
figurable policy changes.
• The use of disabling and inserting posts to modify the
behavior of interconnect in the computation plane.
• The use of rerouting and overriding posts to force bus
traffic in the computation plane to take a detour to an
alternate bus in the control plane where various policies
can be enforced.
• Using disabling posts to partition a computation plane
consisting of entwined cores that are not already spatially
isolated.
• The use of a module in the control plane to erase
architectural state in the computation plane in order to
address data remanence.
• Identification of standard locations for TSV receptacles
on general-purpose processors.
IX. CONCLUSION
Security must become a first-order design constraint in the
engineering of 3-D systems. We have described a design
approach based on a 3-D system security architecture. To
support this approach, we have described two novel circuit-
level primitives: (1) a general-purpose TSV receptacle that
allows the same posts to be reused in different ways by
different applications and (2) a diode that restricts the vertical
flow of information to one direction. Our design approach also
takes advantage of the physical isolation provided by distinct
layers. Finally, we describe modifications to the floor planning
stage of the 3-D design flow that are necessary to support our
design approach. We strongly recommend that the 3-D EDA
community incorporate features in commercial design tools
for the hardware-oriented security and trust community to
constrain the floor planning of components in a 3-D IC. Design
flows should provide researchers and practitioners the flexibil-
ity to, for example, achieve isolation of and programmable
partial ordering of selected components.
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